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Abstract
Recent advances in theoretical and experimental quantum computing bring us closer to
scalable quantum computing devices. This makes the need for protocols that verify the correct
functionality of quantum operations timely and has led to the field of quantum verification.
In this paper we address key challenges to make quantum verification protocols applicable to
experimental implementations. We prove the robustness of the single server verifiable universal
blind quantum computing protocol of Fitzsimons and Kashefi [1] in the most general scenario.
This includes the case where the purification of the deviated input state is in the hands of an
adversarial server. The proved robustness property allows the composition of this protocol with
a device-independent state tomography protocol that we give, which is based on the rigidity
of CHSH games as proposed by Reichardt, Unger and Vazirani [2]. The resulting composite
protocol has lower round complexity for the verification of entangled quantum servers with a
classical verifier and, as we show, can be made fault tolerant.
Keywords: Delegated Quantum Computation, Quantum Verification, Device Independence, Com-
position, Fault Tolerance
1 Introduction
While the prospect of commercially available universal quantum computing is still distant, a num-
ber of experiments involving multi-qubit systems have recently been developed. Irrespective of
their applications, these technologies require methods and tools for verifying the correctness of
their operations. Assuming that quantum computing is more powerful than classical computing,
a simulation-based approach for quantum verification of devices with sufficiently large number of
qubits, becomes practically impossible. Aaronson and Arkhipov showed in [3] that even a rudimen-
tary quantum computer constructed with linear-optical elements cannot be efficiently simulated.
Similarly, verifying the correct preparation of a general n qubit state via state tomography also
involves exponential overhead since it requires collecting statistics from 4n separate observables [4].
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The verification of quantum devices becomes more complicated when the functionality involves
cryptographic primitives. In these cases, incorrect operations could be the result of actions of
an adversary. Thus it becomes necessary to guarantee the security of the application under certain
assumptions about the devices. Ideally a protocol should remain secure even if the devices are faulty
and partially controlled by adversaries. This would lead to a solution that is device-independent and
robust. However, generating such protocols has proven difficult. Even in quantum key distribution,
a complete proof of security for a device-independent protocol, in the presence of noise, has been
achieved only recently [5].
The issue of verification needs to be resolved to be able to exploit successfully any future
quantum computers. Moreover, one expects that the first large scale quantum devices are unlikely
to be personal computers. Instead, they will probably function as servers to which clients can
connect and request the computation of some difficult problem. The client may also require his
computation to be private, i.e. require that the server does not learn anything about it. We should
therefore construct protocols that verify an arbitrary delegated quantum computation and prove
the security and correctness of this verification technique.
The approaches that have been so far successful are those based on interactive proof systems
[6, 7], where a trusted, computationally limited verifier (also known as client, in a cryptographic
setting) exchanges messages with an untrusted, powerful quantum prover, or multiple provers (also
known as servers). The verifier attempts to certify that, with high probability, the provers are
performing the correct quantum operations. Because we are dealing with a new form of computation,
the verification protocols, while based on established techniques are fundamentally different from
their classical counterparts. A number of quantum verification protocols have been developed, for
different functionalities of devices and using a variety of different strategies to achieve verification
[1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. The assumptions made depend on the specific target
and desired properties of the protocol. For example, if the emphasis is on creating an immediate
practical implementation, then this should be reflected in the technological requirements leading
to a testable application with current technology [17]. Alternatively, if the motivation is to prove a
theoretical result, we may relax some requirements such as efficient scaling [2]. An important open
problem in the field of quantum verification, is whether a scheme with a fully classical verifier is
possible [18, 19]. We know, however, that verification is possible in the following two scenarios:
1. A verifier with minimal quantum capacity (ability to prepare random single qubits) and a
single quantum prover [1]. This is the Fitzsimons and Kashefi (FK) protocol.
2. A fully classical verifier and two non-communicating quantum provers that share entanglement
[20]. This is the Reichardt, Unger and Vazirani (RUV) protocol.
One of our objectives is to obtain a device independent (allowing untrusted quantum devices)
version of the FK protocol, by composing it with the RUV protocol. The additional properties
we aim to achieve from this composition are fault tolerance (allowing noisy devices) and reduced
round complexity. Composing protocols can indeed be fruitful since it could lead to new protocols
that inherit the advantages of both constituents. The universal composabillity framework, allow-
ing for secure compositions, has been successfully extended to the quantum realm [21, 22, 23].
Recently, the security of single server verifiable universal blind quantum computing protocols has
been demonstrated in an abstract cryptographic framework [24] that is also known to be equivalent
to the simulation-based composability framework. However this setting does not fulfil the neces-
sary requirements for our composition. This is because, when combining a single server verification
scheme (FK) with an entangled server scheme (RUV), there exists the possibility of correlated
attacks, which are not explicitly treated in the composability framework. Such attacks can occur
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when an untrusted server’s strategy is correlated with deviations in the protocol’s input state. Our
robustness result resolves this issue in the stand alone composition setting and the same technique
could potentially be extended to the composable framework of [24], thus resolving the problem of
correlated attacks.
The type of composition that we require is sequential. We take the output of the first protocol
and use it as input for the second. However, in general, the output of the first protocol is not
necessarily an acceptable input for the second protocol. In particular, since the verification protocols
are probabilistic, their outputs typically deviate by a small amount from the ideal one. Thus, it
is necessary that the second protocol remain secure even if the input is slightly deviated from the
ideal one. Moreover, we make sure that adversaries cannot exploit any correlations between the
deviated input and their strategy to compromise the security of the protocol. Therefore to securely
compose the protocols, we need to address these new type of attacks. The main results of this paper
can be summarised as follows:
1. We prove that the FK protocol is strongly robust, see Theorem 1. First, we show that FK
can tolerate inputs which deviate from their ideal values by a small amount, see Lemma 7.
However, for composition with other protocols a stronger property is needed. We therefore
proceed to show that the FK protocol is robust even when the deviated input is correlated
with an external system possessed by an adversary (for example the provers’ private systems
in the RUV protocol), see Lemma 8.
2. An immediate consequence of the robustness theorem is that we can construct a composite
protocol combining RUV with FK. The required input states for the FK protocol are prepared
via the state tomography sub-protocol of RUV. Our composite protocol inherits the device
independence property of RUV, see Theorem 3. Additionally, since we do not require the full
RUV protocol, the composite protocol also has an improved round complexity.
3. Lastly, we address the distinction between robustness and fault tolerance and show how the
FK protocol can be made fault tolerant, thereby making our proposed composite approach
fault tolerant as well.
In Section 1.1 we give some preliminaries. In Section 2 we present the main results, that we sum-
marised above, and outline their proofs. In particular we give robustness in Subsection 2.1, com-
position in Subsection 2.2 and fault tolerance in Subsection 2.3. Further details of the proofs are
given in Section 3 for robustness, in Section 4 for composition and in Section 5 for fault tolerance.
We conclude in Section 6.
1.1 Preliminaries
We first introduce the relevant concepts used in describing verification protocols and then briefly
present the two protocols we will built on (FK and RUV).
1.1.1 Interactive Proof Systems
As explained in [6, 10], a language L is said to admit an interactive proof system if there exists a
computationally unbounded prover P and a BPP verifier V, such that for any x ∈ L, P convinces
V that x ∈ L with probability ≥ 23 . Additionally, when x 6∈ L, P convinces V that x ∈ L with
probability ≤ 13 . Mathematically, we have the following two conditions1:
1 Note that completeness can be viewed as the probability of the verifier accepting when the prover is honest.
Similarly, soundness is the probability of accepting, when the prover is dishonest.
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• Completeness: Pr(V ↔ P accepts x | x ∈ L) ≥ 23
• Soundness: Pr(V ↔ P accepts x | x 6∈ L) ≤ 13
The set of languages which admit such an interactive proof system define the complexity class IP.
We are interested in the case when the prover is a polynomial-time quantum computer (i.e. a BQP
machine). In [10], the first definition of such a quantum interactive proof system was given, which
we use here:
Definition 1. [10] Quantum Prover Interactive Proof (QPIP) is an interactive proof system with
the following properties:
(i) The prover is computationally restricted to BQP.
(ii) The verifier is a hybrid quantum-classical machine. Its classical part is a BPP machine. The
quantum part is a register of c qubits (for some constant c), on which the prover can perform
arbitrary quantum operations. At any given time, the verifier is not allowed to possess more
than c qubits. The interaction between the quantum and classical parts is the usual one:
the classical part controls which operations are to be performed on the quantum register,
and outcomes of measurements of the quantum register can be used as input to the classical
machine.
(iii) There are two communication channels: one quantum and one classical.
The completeness and soundness conditions are identical to the IP conditions.
We are also interested in interactive protocols that use more than one prover. There are only two
differences, first that the verifier can interact with multiple provers instead of just one, and second
that the provers are not allowed to communicate. The conditions for completeness and soundness
remain unchanged. The analogous complexity class that involves multiple provers is called Multi-
Prover Interactive Proof System and denoted MIP [25]. It is defined as the set of all languages which
admit an interactive proof system with one or more non-communicating provers. If the number of
provers is fixed to be k, the corresponding complexity class is MIP[k]. A closely related class is
MIP* where the multiple non-communicating provers share entangled states.
In all of these cases, the verifier is essentially delegating a difficult computation to the prover(s).
This computation can be universal with respect to the computation model of the prover(s). In our
case, this means universal for polynomial-time quantum computations. The number of classical
messages exchanged between the verifier and the prover, throughout the run of the protocol, as a
function of the input size is known as the round complexity of the protocol.
1.1.2 Quantum Protocols
Throughout this subsection, we assume the reader is familiar with the teleportation-based and more
generally measurement-based quantum computing (MBQC) models, described in detail in [26, 27].
We first summarise the FK protocol [1] which is a QPIP protocol. It is also known as uncon-
ditionally secure, verifiable, universal blind quantum computing. The protocol is “blind” which
means that no information about the computation is leaked to the prover, apart from its size. This
property can be exploited by allowing the verifier to insert hidden “traps” within the computation.
The traps are deterministic tests which the verifier can perform in order to verify that the prover
is not deviating from the protocol. Blindness ensures that the traps are indistinguishable from the
computation.
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The basic idea of this protocol is that the verifier prepares and sends qubits to the prover. The
prover entangles these qubits and then performs adaptive measurements (sending the measurement
outcomes to the verifier) that will overall implement a certain unitary operation, as in the MBQC
model of computation. The traps are single isolated qubits, disentangled from the rest of the
computation, and when measured in suitable bases give deterministic outcomes that are known to
the verifier (but not to the prover). Since the prover is completely blind and does not know which
qubits are traps and which are part of the actual computation, any attempt to cheat has some
probability to affect the trap and thus be detected.
The FK protocol is based on a universal resource state for the MBQC model, known as the
dotted-complete graph state. The details of this resource state are not crucial for understanding
this paper, apart from the fact that, as part of the FK protocol, the appropriate operators are
performed by the untrusted server to prepare this generic state. In particular, a series of controlled-
Z operators are performed by the server, according to the dotted-complete graph structure, for
entangling the individual qubits prepared in advance by the verifier. These initial qubits, that are
sometimes referred to as the input of the FK protocol, are sent to the server at the first stage
of the protocol. This fact is used to prove some basic properties needed for our main robustness
result, see Theorem 2. Therefore, for the purpose of completeness, we state here the definition of
the dotted-complete graph state, taken from [1], see also Figure 1.
Definition 2. [1] Let KN denote the complete graph of N vertices. Define the dotted-complete
graph, denoted as K˜N , to be a graph where every edge in KN is replaced with a new vertex connected
to the two vertices originally joined by that edge. We call the quantum state corresponding to K˜N
the dotted-complete graph state. This multi-partite entangled state is prepared by replacing every
vertex with a qubit in the state |+〉 and applying a controlled-Z operator for every edge in the graph.
Figure 1: An example of a complete graph, K6, and its corresponding dotted-complete graph K˜6.
The family of dotted-complete graph states is universal for quantum computation. Moreover,
any other graph state could be obtained from a large enough dotted-complete graph state by
applying the appropriate Pauli measurements over some of the vertices (the ones shown in white,
in Figure 1). Concretely, in order to construct any desired graph of N vertices from a dotted-
complete graph K˜N , Pauli Y measurements are performed in order to keep a specific edge, and
Pauli Z measurements in order to remove it (alternatively, one could use the states |0〉, |1〉 for the
edges which should be removed, instead of performing a Pauli Z measurement). This can be done
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Protocol 1 Fitzsimons, Kashefi QPIP Protocol from [1]
Assumptions
The verifier wants to delegate a quantum computation described by the graph G and specific
measurement angles φi ∈ {0, pi/4...7pi/4} chosen to define a desired computation. He chooses
a security parameter d and encodes this graph into the topological error correcting scheme of
Raussendorf, Harrington and Goyal [28], that can correct or detect errors with weight less than d.
The encoded graph, G, will have N qubits. He then considers a random hidden partitioning of the
vertices of the dotted-complete graph K˜3N into 3 subgraphs: the computation graph G, and two
different types of isolated traps which the verifier will use in order to test the prover’s honesty in
performing measurements. All measurements are performed in the XY -plane.
Protocol
1. Verifier prepares and sends the 3N(3N + 1)/2 qubits to the prover (the number of vertices in
K˜3N ). These consist of dummy qubits which are either |0〉 or |1〉 (isolating their neighbouring
vertices from the rest of the computation) and computation or trap qubits which are of the
form |+θ〉 = 1√2(|0〉+ eiθ |1〉), where θ ∈ {0, pi/4...7pi/4}.
2. The prover entangles the qubits according to the structure of the K˜3N graph by applying
controlled-Z operations between any pair of vertices that are connected with an edge.
3. For each qubit i, the verifier computes the measurement angle δi = θi + φ
′
i + ripi, where φ
′
i
is the adapted version of the computation angle φi, and ri is a randomly chosen bit {0, 1}.
Adapted computation angles are used to account for corrections from previous measurements.
The measurement angles φi, for the trap qubits, are randomly fixed to be 0 or pi. However, due
to blindness provided by the initial θi rotations in the preparation of individual qubits (Step 1
above), the value of δi is uniformly distributed over the set {0, pi/4...7pi/4}. The verifier sends
these measurement angles one by one to the prover. The prover measures each corresponding
qubit in the |+δi〉, |−δi〉 basis, and sends his reply bi to the verifier.
4. The verifier accepts if for all trap qubits, the reported measurement outcome bt is the same
as the expected outcome rt.
blindly in order to hide the target graph. The detailed construction is not important for the rest of
this paper and hence omitted (see Section 5 in [1]). We give a brief description of FK, shown here
as Protocol 1.
According to Definition 1 the quantum channel between verifier and prover is one-way (from the
verifier to the prover). Moreover, the constant c, representing the number of qubits that the verifier
can possess at any given time, is exactly one. We refer the reader to [1] for a more in depth
description of the protocol and its associated concepts. However, we recall the key properties of the
protocol in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Assuming the verifier wants to delegate the computation of a circuit of size N , the
FK protocol has O(N2) round complexity and uses O(N2) qubits with completeness being exactly 1
while the soundness is upper bounded by (2/3)d
2d
5
e, where d is the security parameter.
Proof. It is clear from Protocol 1 that the total number of qubits used in the protocol is 3N(3N +
1)/2, where N is the number of qubits for the encoded graph G. Additionally, we have the same
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number of rounds of classical communication, corresponding to the measurements of qubits in the
dotted-complete graph (each measurement requires 3 classical bits to specify the measurement angle
and 1 bit to specify the outcome). Both the overall round complexity and the required quantum
resources are thus O(N2).
As described in Protocol 1, the verifier accepts if and only if all trap measurements succeed. This
is always the case if the prover is honest and follows the instructions, since the trap measurements
are deterministic. Therefore, the probability that the verifier accepts when the prover is honest is
exactly 1 (completeness). On the other hand, it is shown in [1] that in the case of classical output,
the protocol is (2/3)d
2d
5
e-verifiable, meaning the soundness is upper bounded by (2/3)d
2d
5
e.
Next we summarise the RUV protocol [2] which is a MIP* protocol. It relies on the rigidity of
CHSH games [29, 20] to test the honesty of the provers (c.f. traps at the FK protocol), and on gate
teleportation to perform the computation. In particular, the verifier directs the provers to perform
a series of local measurements of their parts of the shared entangled states. The purpose of this
is to check for statistical violations of Bell’s inequality. At the same time, the verifier makes the
provers teleport quantum states into gates in order to perform his desired quantum computation
[20]. Importantly, the verifier alternates between these strategies in such a way that the provers are
not aware (they are blind) in which strategy their measurement belongs. Moreover, the two provers
cannot use previous results in order to deviate from the protocol (i.e. there is no adaptive cheating
strategy). This is summarised as Protocol 2. Due to the rigidity of the CHSH games, as proved
in [2], the verifier can determine if the two provers are being honest or not from the statistical
outcomes. To ensure the verification of universal computations, the resource preparation stage of
the protocol will prepare multiple copies of the states:{
P |0〉 , (HP )2 |ψ∗〉 , (GY )2 |ψ∗〉 , CNOT2,4P2Q4(|ψ∗〉 ⊗ |ψ∗〉) : P,Q ∈ {I,X, Y, Z}
}
Here, |ψ∗〉 denotes the Bell state |00〉+|11〉√
2
which is shared among the two provers. In fact the
provers share multiple copies of |ψ∗〉, each prover having one qubit from each Bell pair. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that prover 1 has the first qubit and prover 2 has the second
qubit. The Hadamard, Phase and controlled-Not gates (denoted as {H,G,CNOT}) constitute a
universal gate set for quantum computation. The subscript indices indicate on which qubits the
gate acts. An arbitrary quantum circuit is thus simulated by repeatedly doing gate teleportations,
while keeping the computation blind from the two provers the entire time.
Lemma 2. Assuming the verifier wants to delegate the computation of a circuit of size n, the round
complexity of the RUV protocol is O(nc), where there exists some constant c, such that c ≥ 8192.
Proof. To determine an upper bound for the round complexity we only need to inspect the number
of rounds of CHSH games, since the protocol randomly alternates between this and the other three
subprotocols. As shown in Protocol 2, the verifier plays N sets of CHSH games with the two provers.
Each set consists of qns games and ns ≥ n64. Additionally, it is required that N ≥ (qns)α−1, where
nα/2 ≥ n64, so α ≥ 128. These conditions are necessary for the correctness of the state tomography
and process tomography subprotocols [20]. We then have that N ≥ dn8128, where d is a constant of
the form d = qα−1. This is the number of sets of CHSH games and hence the number of required
games is lower bounded by n8192. It follows that the number of rounds is O(nc), where c ≥ 8192.
Note that by “lower bounded” we refer to the case when all of the CHSH statistics are consistent
and the verifier does not reject. In the case of inconsistent statistics, the verifier can reject before
playing n8192 games.
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The subprotocols of the RUV protocol are themselves verification protocols as proved in [20].
The subprotocol that we will use is the state tomography protocol. As part of the RUV protocol, it
is used to prepare resource states which are XZ-determined, i.e. states that are uniquely determined
by their traces against X and Z operators. To compose the RUV with the FK protocol we will use
a modified version of the state tomography subprotocol, so that we can prepare all states that are
allowed inputs for the FK protocol. We will give the modified protocol in the next section.
Protocol 2 Reichardt, Unger, Vazirani MIP* Protocol from [20] (for two provers)
Assumptions
The verifier delegates a quantum circuit of size n to two quantum provers. Let ns = n
α/2 ≥ n64,
q = 11, ng = qns, N ≥ nα−1g and δ = 1/(6nα/8). The two provers share Nng Bell states.
Protocol
The verifier alternates randomly between four subprotocols. He chooses the first three with proba-
bility (1− δ)/3) and the last one with probability δ.
1. CHSH games. The verifier referees N sets of sequential CHSH games, each consisting of ng
games between the provers. He rejects if they win less than:
cos2(pi/8)Nng − 1
2
√
2
√
Nng log(Nng)
of the games.
2. State tomography. The verifier chooses K ∈ [N ] uniformly at random and referees K − 1
sets of CHSH games. He sends the questions from the Kth set to prover 1, while running a
state tomography protocol with prover 2. In this protocol prover 2 is asked to prepare q-qubit
resource states by measuring his halves of the shared Bell states. This will collapse prover 1’s
states to the same q-qubit resource states up to corrections. The verifier checks this using the
CHSH measurement outcomes from prover 1. These outcomes tomographically determine the
states that are being prepared. He rejects if the tomography statistics are inconsistent.
3. Process tomography. The verifier chooses K ∈ [N ] uniformly at random and referees K−1
sets of CHSH games. He sends the questions from the Kth set to prover 2, while running a
process tomography protocol with prover 1. In this protocol prover 1 is asked to perform Bell
measurements on his halves of the shared Bell states. The verifier checks this using the CHSH
measurement outcomes from prover 2. He rejects if the tomography statistics are inconsistent.
4. Computation. The verifier chooses K ∈ [N ] uniformly at random and refereed K − 1
sets of CHSH games. In the Kth game he runs a state tomography protocol with prover 2
and a process tomography protocol with prover 1. The combination of these two achieves
computation via gate teleportation.
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2 Main Results
2.1 Robustness
The first result we prove is that the FK protocol is robust with respect to small variations in the
input. Throughout this paper, by “input” we are referring to the quantum states that the verifier
sends to the prover and not the computation input. Without loss of generality we can assume that
the desired computation that will be delegated to the server has the fixed classical input 0, . . . 0.
Dealing with arbitrary classical or quantum input is straightforward, as explained in [1], and makes
no difference for our result. Hence, for the rest of this paper we define the input state of the FK
protocol to be the tensor product of the individual qubits prepared by the verifier, comprising the
dotted-complete graph before the prover applies controlled-Z to entangle them (these include the
computation, trap and dummy qubits).
The fact that FK is robust means that the protocol’s input state can be deviated from its ideal
value by some small amount and the protocol will continue to function. In particular, this input
state could be the output of some other protocol, provided that this state was close to its ideal
value. As we will see in the next subsection, the RUV protocol is capable of such a preparation.
We start by formally defining robustness in this context.
Definition 3 (Robustness). A verification protocol with quantum input is robust if, given that the
protocol input is -close in trace distance to the ideal input, in the limit where → 0 the completeness
and soundness bounds remain unchanged.
Mathematically, if we denote the multi-qubit input state as ρ, and the pure states comprising
the ideal input as pii, where i goes from 1 to the number of qubits, we have that:
‖ρ−
⊗
i
pii‖Tr ≤  (1)
Note that ρ is of the same dimension as
⊗
i pii as it does not contain any ancilla qubits from the
environment. Given the definition of robustness, we prove that:
Theorem 1. The FK protocol is robust and given an input which is -close to its ideal value, the
completeness is lower bounded by 1− 2 and the soundness bound changes by at most O(√).
Because we are tracing out the environment, which could be controlled by an adversary, the security
of the protocol, with a deviated input state, needs to be re-established. We highlight this in the
following proof sketch of Theorem 1:
Proof sketch. We first examine soundness which considers the case of a dishonest prover. Intuitively,
when the prover is malevolent, he will try to convince the verifier to accept an incorrect outcome
and thus deviate from the correct protocol. However, as shown in [1], no matter how much the
prover deviates, the probability for the verifier to accept a wrong outcome is bounded. If the input
to the protocol is already deviated from the ideal, one could expect that the soundness bound
remains unchanged. The effect of a deviated input could be incorporated in the deviated actions of
the prover. This is indeed the case when the input is uncorrelated with any external system and
we can express the deviation as a CPTP map (see Lemma 7 for detailed proof).
In the general case, however, the deviated input could be correlated with subsystems controlled
by adversaries. This deviation could be used by the prover to improve his cheating probability.
Mathematically this is manifested by the fact that the prover’s action in the presence of initial
correlations is not in general a trace preserving map. It can be expressed as a linear combination
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of a CPTP deviation and an inhomogeneous term which could be either positive or negative as
shown in the [30]. In this case, we use the -closeness of the input state to derive a bound of order
O(
√
) for the norm of the inhomogeneous term. From linearity, and using the previous argument
it follows that in the general case the soundness bound changes by at most O(
√
) (see Lemma 8
for detailed proof).
In the case of completeness, we are assuming the prover is honest. If we start with an -close
input state, because of the linearity of the operators involved, we will end up with an output state
that is O()-close to the ideal output (see Lemma 9 for detailed proof).
A similar approach to Lemma 7 was used in [31] for defining approximate blindness, and in [24] to
prove universal composability for blind quantum computing protocols. However, to our knowledge,
these results are not strong enough to cover the requirements for the composition with the RUV
protocol. In [31] only the blindness property was examined while verifying the computation was not
considered. In [24] they considered local-verifiability which does not take into account for example,
the possibility of correlated attacks such as those that are possible when the two provers have a
prearranged correlated strategy.
2.2 Composition
One of our main objectives is to construct a device independent version of the FK protocol. The
first step, was to show that FK is robust. This property guarantees that if we have an input state
that is only approximately the ideal one, the protocol continues to work. We can now break the
task of achieving device independent FK into two parts, which we need to compose sequentially.
1. State Preparation - use a device independent protocol to prepare on the prover’s side a
state which is -close to the FK input.
2. Verified Delegated Computation - run the FK protocol with the prover that has the
-close input state (since robustness allows this).
The advantage of this technique is that we are free to use any protocol for state preparation as long
as we have the guarantee of -closeness. This is due to our strong robustness result, which shows
that FK will work even if the deviation in the prepared state is correlated with the prover’s cheating
strategy in the delegated computation stage. In this paper, we achieve state preparation using the
device-independent state tomography sub-protocol of RUV. This sub-protocol has the -closeness
property that we require, as explained in [20]. The resulting composite protocol will have a better
round complexity than the full RUV protocol for the verification of quantum computations. The
complexity can be improved further if a more efficient state preparation protocol is used. Recently,
in an independent work that simultaneously appeared with our arxiv version, a more efficient
scheme for state preparation is proposed that is based on a self-testing approach [32] rather than
the rigidity of CHSH games [20].
We first clarify some details of the RUV protocol, which are essential in understanding how our
composite protocol will work. RUV uses the rigidity property of CHSH games to determine that the
provers share multiple copies of the Bell state |Φ+〉 = (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2, which is XZ-determined.
They can then use XZ state tomography to verify the preparation of any other XZ-determined
state. In particular, they use it to tomographically verify the preparation of a set of states which
can be used to perform universal computation. They also describe how it is possible to extend
the protocol in order to have full tomography with the Y operator as well [20]. However, because
they are using the |Φ+〉 Bell state, it is only possible to fix the Y operator up to a sign change.
That is, the provers can always choose to measure in either the Y or −Y bases without being
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detected (this corresponds to complex conjugating the states with respect to their representations
in the computational basis). In fact this problem has been noticed by others as well [12, 33]. As
explained in [20], it is possible to force the provers to consistently choose either Y or −Y for their
measurements. This makes the resulting state prepared by state tomography close to either the
ideal state or the complex conjugate of the ideal state.
At first glance it would seem that this could be problematic for the FK protocol. We would have
to show that running the FK protocol with an input state that is close to the complex conjugated
version of the ideal input would be detected by the verifier. Intuitively this is the case, since trap
qubits are in the XY -plane and complex conjugating them would lead to different measurement
outcomes. We will not prove this and instead provide a simpler solution.
The problem stems from the fact that we are using the XZ-determined |Φ+〉 state. Let us
instead consider the state |Ψ+〉 = (|01〉 + |10〉)/√2. Using Theorem 2 from [20], and the fact that
|Ψ+〉 has stabilizer generator set {X ⊗X,Y ⊗ Y } which belongs to {I,X, Y }⊗2 we have that this
state is XY -determined.
Theorem 2. [20] A stabilizer state is determined by any of its sets of stabilizer generators.
In principle it is possible to run a form of the RUV protocol in which we choose the CHSH games
such that we rigidly determine that the provers share multiple copies of the Bell state |Ψ+〉 instead
of |Φ+〉. Analogous to the previous case, the extended form of the protocol would then fix the Z
operator up to a sign change (instead of the Y operator). This means that the provers can always
perform a reflection about the XY plane with no noticeable changes. However, the XY plane states
are invariant under such a reflection. We can therefore use this to prepare the input which will be
used by the FK protocol. The only problem we encounter is that we also require the preparation of
|0〉 and |1〉 states which act as dummy qubits in the FK protocol [1]. As described in Protocol 1 these
dummy qubits are measured in order to “break” the dotted-complete graph into the computation
graph and the two trap graphs. The problem is that the XY plane reflection has the effect of
flipping the computational basis states (state |0〉 becomes |1〉 and state |1〉 becomes |0〉). However
this deviation (flip) has to be applied globally otherwise it affects the statistics of the CHSH game
and thus the verifier rejects [20]. Such a global flip is detected by the FK protocol. A formal proof
is given in Lemma 10, Section 4, while below we give a sketch of the proof.
In the honest scenario for the FK protocol, the measurement of a dummy qubit in state |1〉
introduces an additional Z correction to its neighbouring qubits (this is because we are using the
controlled-Z operation for entangling qubits). Hence in a malicious setting the effect that a flip
has on a trap qubit with an odd number of neighbouring dummy qubits, leads to an extra Z
operation. Such a Z flip changes a |+θ〉 state to |−θ〉. Thus, the measurement of this trap qubit will
deterministically fail and the verifier will detect this. On the other hand, since the verifier chooses
the input, he can always pad the computation such that the overall graph has trap qubits with an
odd number of neighbour dummy qubits. This is due to the fact that in a dotted-complete graphs
(Definition 2), some of the traps will have N − 1 neighbouring dummy qubits. Therefore, if the
size of the input computation N is odd, the verifier need only pad the computation size to become
N + 1.
Now we are in a position to construct the composite protocol which composes RUV with FK.
We give a modified version of the state tomography protocol of RUV (see Protocol 3). Proof that
Protocol 3 is valid verification protocol is given in Section 4. The purpose of this modification is
to verifiably prepare the minimal resource states which are subsequently used as inputs for the FK
protocol.
The composite protocol, given as Protocol 4, is the sequential composition of the modified state
tomography of Protocol 3 with both provers followed by the FK protocol with prover 1. Note that
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Protocol 3 Modified State Tomography Protocol
Assumptions
Let S = {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), 1√
2
(1, 1, 0), 1√
2
(1,−1, 0), 1√
2
(1, 0, 1), 1√
2
(1, 0,−1), 1√
2
(0, 1, 1),
1√
2
(0, 1,−1)}. Let Mv be a 2 outcome projective measurement defined by the projectors:
1
2(I + ~v · (X,Y, Z)) and 12(I − ~v · (X,Y, Z)).
Let the tuple (~a,~b) ∈ S × S denote the measurements Ma for prover 1 and Mb for prover 2 that
they need to perform on their halves on an entangled state when instructed by the verifier. Sets of
such tuples define CHSH games. For example the set {(1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1)}×{ 1√
2
(1, 0, 1), 1√
2
(1, 0,−1)}
defines the XZ CHSH game. Given S, there are six such sets of CHSH games (two XZ, two XY
and two YZ) [20]. For a suitable numbering of these games, let CHSHi be the ith CHSH game,
i ∈ {1, ...6}.
Protocol
The verifier alternates uniformly at random between the following subprotocols:
1. CHSH games. Verifier referees 6N sets of sequential CHSH games, such that each group of
N sets is one of the six possible CHSH types of games. Each set consists of ng games between
prover 1 and prover 2. For each group of N CHSH games the verifier rejects if the two provers
win less than:
cos2(pi/8)Nng − 1
2
√
2
√
Nng log(Nng)
of the games.
2. State tomography. Verifier chooses K ∈ [N ] uniformly at random and also randomly
chooses CHSHi as one of the six possible CHSH games. Then he referees K − 1 sets of
CHSHi games, sending the questions from the Kth set to prover 1, while running a state
tomography protocol with prover 2. In this protocol prover 2 is asked to prepare resource
states by measuring his halves of the shared Bell states. This will collapse prover 1’s states
to the same resource states up to corrections. In the context of composition, these resource
states will constitute the FK input. The verifier uses the measurement outcomes of prover
1 to tomographically check this preparation. He rejects if the tomography statistics are in-
consistent. In the end, if the verifier accepts, he concludes that with high probability prover
1 has a state which is close in trace distance to the tensor product of resource states. The
formal statement of this fact is given in Theorem 5, taken from [20], and more precisely in
Equation 42 from Lemma 12.
since prover 1 is involved in both state tomography as well as the FK protocol, the strong version
of the robustness property is required. This is to address the effect of any potential correlated
attacks where provers 1 and 2 have agreed in advance on a strategy. The deviations of prover 2, in
the preparation stage, could be correlated with the deviations of prover 1 during the computation
stage (FK). This is the first rigorous proof of a protocol that involves lifting the FK protocol to the
entangled provers setting. We give here the correctness and soundness of this protocol and show
that it is more efficient than the RUV protocol (Theorem 3) while in Section 4 we give the proof
of this theorem.
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Protocol 4 Composite Verification Protocol
1. Run the modified state tomography protocol (Protocol 3).
2. From the states prepared by this protocol on prover 1’s side, select the input for FK and run
the FK protocol with prover 1. (Protocol 1)
Theorem 3. Assuming the verifier wants to delegate the computation of a quantum circuit of size
n, Protocol 4 is a MIP* verification protocol having completeness lower bounded by 1−O(n−1/128),
soundness upper bounded by
(
2
3
)d 2d
5
e
+ O(n−1/12), where d is the security parameter of the FK
protocol, and round complexity O(nc), where there exists some constant c such that c > 2048.
While the obtained round complexity is an improvement over RUV (Lemma 2) it is still far
from practical. However, we believe our approach serves as a proof of principle, that this type of
composition can be beneficial. It also highlights where improvements could be made. It is the state
tomography subprotocol that increases the round complexity, while the FK protocol has a relatively
low complexity2. The detailed proofs are given in Section 4.
2.3 Fault Tolerance
In constructing our composite verification protocol, we used the robustness of the FK protocol. Our
last result is to characterise the difference between robustness and fault tolerance and to show that
the FK protocol can be made fault tolerant using a topological error correcting code. Consequently,
our composite protocol can also be made fault tolerant provided that the state tomography part is
run on top of an error correcting code.
As mentioned before robustness is a protocol’s ability to continue to function given a deviated
input. Fault tolerance is when a protocol functions correctly in the presence of error prone devices.
The essential assumption for robustness is that the actual (multi-qubit) input is -close to its ideal
value. Fault tolerant protocols, on the other hand, assume that errors can occur at each individual
qubit. The faulty devices are usually represented by the action of a partially depolarizing channel:
E = (1 − p)[I] + p3([X] + [Y ] + [Z]). Here p is the probability of error, and the square brackets
indicate the action of an operator. This leads to the following observation:
Lemma 3. Let σ = ⊗ni=1ρi be a system of n qubits. Assume each qubit goes through a partially
depolarizing channel E having probability of error p > 0. Let the state of the system, after all qubits
have passed through the channel, be σ′ = ⊗ni=1E(ρi). We have that ‖σ − σ′‖Tr ≤ min(1, np) and
there exist states σ for which ‖σ − σ′‖Tr = 1.
This means that the deviation of an n-qubit system from the ideal input is not bounded by some
constant amount. This is intuitively clear, since by adding more qubits, we introduce more errors
and the state of the composite system is further from its intended value. In contrast to this, when
considering robustness, the distance between the actual and ideal state is bounded by an arbitrarily
small quantity. We will now address how can we do verification in an error prone setting.
Lemma 4. Assume we run the FK protocol with NT traps and each qubit is subject to the action of a
partially depolarizing channel E having probability of error p > 0. Given the simplifying assumption
2Note that the round complexity of FK could be further reduced to linear, if one is willing to admit a higher upper
bound for soundness.
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Protocol 5 Fault Tolerant FK Protocol
Assumptions
The verifier wants to compute the execution of a measurement graph G having n qubits. Both the
verifier and prover’s devices are subject to noise modelled as a partially depolarizing channel acting
on the preparation of the qubits and the application of the quantum gates. For single qubits the
channel is described by:
E1 = (1− p)[I] + p
3
([X] + [Y ] + [Z]) (2)
And for two qubit states by:
E2 = (1− p)[I ⊗ I] + p
15
([I ⊗X] + · · ·+ [Z ⊗ Z]) (3)
Additionally assume p ≤ pcorrect, where pcorrect is a threshold such that depolarizing noise bellow
this threshold is corrected by the topologically protected code from [28].
Let Gν denote a brickwork state encoding the graph G and containing one trap qubit, as explained
in [1]. Let Lν denote a fault tolerant encoding of the graph Gν using the topologically protected
code from [28]. The encoding is done as explained in [34], hence Lν will be decorated lattices (see
Figures 1, 2 in [34]). The index ν denotes the randomness in the θ angles for the encoding as chosen
by the verifier. Let S ν˜ = Lν1 ⊗Lν2 ⊗ · · · ⊗LνN , where R/ log
(
cn
cn−1
)
< N < R/ log
(
cn
cn−1
)
+O(1),
for some constants R > 1, c > 2 and ν˜ = {ν1 · · · νN}. We will refer to S ν˜ as a sequence of encodings.
Protocol
1. The verifier chooses R > 1 and constructs the random set ν˜.
2. The verifier prepares the qubits for the sequence S ν˜ and sends them to the prover along with
instructions on how to construct S ν˜ .
3. The verifier sends measurement instructions to the prover in order to compute the executions
of the encoded graphs.
4. The prover sends the measurement outcomes to the verifier.
5. Steps 3 and 4 repeat until the verifier either accepts or rejects.
The verifier rejects if any of the traps fail. He takes the outcome of the computation to be the
majority outcome over all computations (graphs Lνi).
that if a qubit is changed (through the action of an X, Y or Z operator) it will produce an incorrect
measurement outcome, the completeness of this protocol is upper bounded by (1− p)NT .
It is evident that assuming faulty devices where each qubit behaves as if it crossed a partially
depolarizing channel, the completeness of the protocol becomes exponentially small (as function
of the number of traps). This is clearly unsatisfactory. The arguably simplest solution would be
to alter the acceptance condition of the protocol. Since it is unlikely that all trap measurements
succeed, even for honest prover, the verifier should accept a result if the traps that succeed are
above some fixed fraction.
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Lemma 5. Assume we run a modified FK protocol with NT traps and each qubit is subject to the
action of a partially depolarizing channel E having probability of error p > 0. The modification is
that the verifier accepts if there are fewer than NT (p + ) mistakes at trap measurements, where
 > 0 is a suitably chosen small number. The completeness of this protocol is lower bounded by
1− exp(−22NT ).
The above modification resolves the issue raised regarding the completeness bound. However, if
we were to make such modification, we have the following consequence for the soundness of the
protocol:
Lemma 6. Assume we run a modified FK protocol with NT traps, N qubits in total and each
qubit is subject to the action of a partially depolarizing channel E having probability of error p > 0.
The modification is that the verifier accepts if there are fewer than NT (p + ) mistakes at trap
measurements, where  > 0 is a suitably chosen small number. The soundness of this protocol is
upper bounded by
(
NT
N
) (
2
3
)d 2d
5
e
.
We can see that introducing a threshold of acceptance leads to an increased bound on soundness.
Again, expected, since we allow the prover to tamper with some of the traps (and, by extension,
with the computation as well) without rejecting the output. To solve these problems we need to use
a fault tolerant code. The FK protocol already uses a fault tolerant code to encode the computation
graph. However this is done in order to boost the value of the soundness parameter. The trap qubits
are not encoded with the code (only the computation is). Thus we propose a modified FK protocol.
This is described in Protocol 5. In this protocol we encode both computations and traps in a fault
tolerant code and use sequential repetitions (also used in [17]). This leads to our final main result:
Theorem 4. Under the assumption of a faulty setting where qubit preparation and quantum gates
are subject to partially depolarizing noise having bounded probability p, Protocol 5 is a valid verifi-
cation protocol having completeness 1, soundness upper bounded by (1/2)R, where R is a constant
such that R > 1. The protocol has round complexity O(n2).
The proof of this theorem (and previous lemmas) are given in Section 5. An important point to
make is that the composite protocol we constructed can also be made fault tolerant. To achieve
this the state tomography protocol should be run on top of a fault tolerant code. As mentioned in
[20], in principle, this is straightforward for blind, verified computation, since the provers can work
on top of a quantum error-correcting code and entanglement can be distilled with the help of the
verifier [35, 36].
3 Proof of Robustness
In this section we prove the robustness of the FK protocol. We start by first proving a simpler
result, namely the robustness of the protocol under the assumption that the input is uncorrelated
with any external system. We then remove this assumption and use our results to prove the main
theorem, necessary for the composition with the RUV protocol.
Lemma 7. If the initial input state of the FK protocol is -close to the ideal input state and
uncorrelated with any external system, the soundness bound does not change.
Proof. We will follow the same proof technique as in [1] and show that the soundness bound does
not change. This is done by incorporating the assumption of a deviated input into that proof. The
outcome density operator of the protocol is denoted Bj(ν), where ν denotes the verifier’s choices of
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input variables and j ranges over the prover’s choices of possible actions (j = 0 is the correct/honest
action). If the outcome is incorrect it means that all of the traps have passed, but the computation
is not correct. This is associated with the following projection operator [1]:
Pincorrect = (I− |Ψideal〉 〈Ψideal|)
⊗
t∈T
|ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt | (4)
Here, |Ψideal〉 〈Ψideal| is the ideal output state, and
⊗
t∈T |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt | is the state associated with the
trap qubits. Notice that we are projecting to a state in which the output is orthogonal to its ideal
value, and the traps are correct. This expresses the fact that the verifier will accept an incorrect
computation. The associated probability for that event is pincorrect and can be expressed as:
pincorrect =
∑
ν
p(ν)Tr(P νincorrectBj(ν)) (5)
Which is a weighted average of the incorrect outcome probabilities (expressed by the trace operator)
over all possible input states. The outcome density operator can be written as:
Bj(ν) = TrP
∑
b
|b+ cr〉 〈b|CνC ,bΩP
Joint system state σν,b︷ ︸︸ ︷
( (⊗P |0〉 〈0|)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prover’s qubits
⊗
∣∣∣Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
Input state
)P †Ω†C†νC ,b |b〉 〈b+ cr|
 (6)
Notice the following, as explained in [1]:
• We are tracing over the prover’s qubits;
• We have denoted the joint state, comprised of the input and the prover’s qubits, as σν,b;
• j ranges over the prover’s possible strategies (j = 0 is the honest strategy);
• b indicates the possible branches of computation parametrised by the measurement results
sent by the prover to the verifier;
• cr indicates corrections that need to be performed on the final, classical output due to the
MBQC computation together with the random phase introduced by the verifier;
• P is the computation that we want the prover to do;
• Ω is the prover’s deviation from the desired computation;
• CνC ,b are the corrections the prover applies to its quantum output depending on the mea-
surement outcomes (as in the measurement-based model);
We now need to incorporate the approximate input state into this operator. We will not use the
-closeness of the deviated state to the ideal one, and prove a stronger result, that the soundness
bound does not change regardless of the input state. Concretely, assume the deviated input is:
ρν,b = E
(∣∣∣Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b∣∣∣) (7)
Where E is a CPTP map which represents any deviation from the ideal input state either from
incorrect preparation, a malicious prover or faulty devices. This is equivalent to applying some
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unitary U to the input state tensored with some environment qubits that are traced out. We can
express this mathematically as:
ρν,b = TrE(U
(
(⊗E |0〉 〈0|)⊗
∣∣∣Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b∣∣∣)U †) (8)
The joint system state σν,b becomes3:
σν,b = TrE((⊗P |0〉 〈0|)⊗ U
(
(⊗E |0〉 〈0|)⊗
∣∣∣Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b∣∣∣)U †) (9)
Let us consider a new unitary V = (I⊗ U). This allows us to rewrite the joint system state as:
σν,b = TrE(V
(
(⊗E+P |0〉 〈0|)⊗
∣∣∣Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b∣∣∣)V †) (10)
Since P , the computation, is a unitary operator, there must exists some unitary V ′ such that
V = P †V ′P . Substituting this into the previous expression gives us:
σν,b = TrE(P
†V ′P
(
(⊗E+P |0〉 〈0|)⊗
∣∣∣Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b∣∣∣)P †V ′†P ) (11)
Incorporating Equation 11 into the expression for Bj(ν) in Equation 6 we obtain:
Bj(ν) = TrP
(∑
b
|b+ cr〉 〈b|CνC ,bΩP
(TrE(P
†V ′P
(
(⊗E+P |0〉 〈0|)⊗
∣∣∣Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b∣∣∣)P †V ′†P ))
P †Ω†C†νC ,b |b〉 〈b+ cr|
) (12)
The assumption of the lemma is that the input state is not correlated with any external system.
Hence, the spaces E and P are independent. This means that the prover’s deviation, Ω, is not
acting on E and therefore we can “push” the inner trace operator to the beginning of the equation.
Also using the fact that PP † = P †P = I, we obtain:
Bj(ν) = TrP+E
(∑
b
|b+ cr〉 〈b|
CνC ,bΩV
′P ((⊗P+E |0〉 〈0|)⊗
∣∣∣Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b∣∣∣)P †V ′†Ω†C†νC ,b
|b〉 〈b+ cr|
) (13)
We can now include the input deviation given by V ′ into the prover deviation Ω, by considering
Ω′ = ΩV ′. This is possible because we are bounding the probability over all possible deviations, Ω,
of the prover in the computation and all possible deviations, V ′, from the preparation part. Thus,
we can consider this to be a single, global, deviation given by Ω′.
Bj(ν) = TrP+E
(∑
b
|b+ cr〉 〈b|
CνC ,bΩ
′P ((⊗P+E |0〉 〈0|)⊗
∣∣∣Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b∣∣∣)P †Ω′†C†νC ,b
|b〉 〈b+ cr|
) (14)
3Here and in the following expressions we’ve used the fact that the partial trace is linear and can therefore be
moved outside.
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As a result, the above equation has the same form as the undeviated input scenario of Equation 6.
This makes sense since all we have done is to incorporate the deviation of the input into the prover’s
cheating strategy. The original proof continues as it is in [1], and the bound remains unchanged
pincorrect ≤
(
2
3
)d 2d
5
e
(15)
The type of robustness guaranteed by this lemma is not sufficient to prove the security of any
protocol that composes RUV with FK. For example if we use prover 2 of RUV to prepare the
input of the FK protocol for prover 1, this input is in general correlated with prover 2’s system. To
address this issue, we use from [20] the following corollary of the gentle measurement lemma and
the special Kraus representation in the presence of initial correlations given in [30].
Corollary 1. [20] Let ρ be a state on H1⊗H2, and let pi be a pure state on H1. If for some δ ≥ 0,
Tr(piTr2 ρ) ≥ 1− δ, then
||ρ− pi ⊗ Tr1 ρ||Tr ≤ 2
√
δ + δ (16)
Lemma 8. If the initial input state of the FK protocol is -close to the ideal input state the
soundness bound changes by at most O(
√
).
Proof. Consider a composite correlated state ρAB where systems A and B are not communicating
and let ρA = TrB(ρAB) and ρB = TrA(ρAB). If ρA is used as input for the FK protocol, the
existence of correlations (not present in the previous lemma) can be exploited by an adversarial
prover. Hence the deviation can no longer be expressed as a CPTP map over this subsystem. As it
is shown in [30], in presence of initial correlations defined as:
ρcorr = ρAB − ρA ⊗ ρB (17)
the evolution of the subsystem ρA is the following:
ρA → E(ρA) + δρA (18)
Here E is a CPTP map and δρA is an inhomogeneous term which is added to the CPTP evolution
due to the presence of initial correlations. In addition we have the following property:
δρA = TrB(UABρcorrU
†
AB) (19)
We can see that substituting ρA in the outcome density operator of the FK protocol gives different
soundness bound than the one in Lemma 7. The difference stems from the extra δρ term. However
we can use the fact that ρ is -close to the ideal state (lemma assumption) to show that the norm
of δρA is at most of order O(
√
). To prove this we first find a bound for the norm of ρcorr, and
since δρA is just a CPTP map applied to ρcorr it follows that the norm of δρA has the same bound.
Moreover, the action of the FK protocol can be modelled as a CPTP map, therefore acting on δρA
will not increase the norm. It follows that the overall soundness bound changes by at most O(
√
).
If we denote the ideal state as |ψ〉, we know that:
||ρA − |ψ〉 〈ψ| ||Tr ≤  (20)
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It is also known, from the relationship between fidelity and trace distance, that:
1− 〈ψ| ρA |ψ〉 ≤ ||ρA − |ψ〉 〈ψ| ||Tr (21)
Combining these two yields:
〈ψ| ρA |ψ〉 ≥ 1−  (22)
Recall that Tr(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ρA) = 〈ψ| ρA |ψ〉, using Equation 22 and Corollary 1 (where ρ is substituted
with ρAB and pi with |ψ〉 〈ψ|) we have:
||ρAB − |ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ ρB||Tr ≤ 2
√
+  (23)
The trace norm of ρcorr is simply the trace distance between ρAB and ρA⊗ ρB as can be seen from
the definition. Using the triangle inequality, we have:
||ρAB − ρA ⊗ ρB||Tr ≤ ||ρAB − |ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ ρB||Tr + || |ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ ρB − ρA ⊗ ρB||Tr (24)
For the last term, using the additivity of trace distance with respect to tensor product, we get:
|| |ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ ρB − ρA ⊗ ρB||Tr ≤ || |ψ〉 〈ψ| − ρA||Tr + ||ρB − ρB||Tr =  (25)
Combining these last three inequalities we obtain:
||ρAB − ρA ⊗ ρB||Tr ≤ 2
√
+ 2 (26)
Since 0 ≤  ≤ 1, the bound is of order O(√). We have therefore bounded the norm of ρcorr and
thus the norm of δρA.
We can now take our expression for the deviated input from Equation 18 and substitute it into
Equation 8, from Lemma 7. Since trace is a linear operation, it will result in the addition of an
inhomogeneous term to each equation that involves the outcome density operator. But since the
inhomogeneous term has bounded trace norm, and the action of the outcome density operator is
trace preserving, it follows that we obtain the same bound as in Lemma 7 with the addition of an
extra term of order O(
√
). This concludes the proof.
Lemma 9. If the initial input state of the FK protocol is -close to the ideal input state, the
completeness is lower bounded by 1− 2.
Proof. In the simplest sense, the FK protocol can be abstractly thought of as a CPTP map P, that
takes some input state to an output state. Since we are assuming the prover is honest, the output
state will be B0(ν). However, this is in the case where the input is assumed to be ideal. We are
dealing with a deviated input, hence our output state will be B′0(ν). Writing these out explicitly
we have:
B0(ν) = P(|Ψν〉 〈Ψν |) (27)
B′0(ν) = P(ρν) (28)
Where, ρν is the deviated input, and by assumption
‖ρν − |Ψν〉 〈Ψν | ‖Tr ≤  (29)
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Note that in the following we do not need to consider non CPTP map evolution since the provers
are assumed to behave honestly. Hence even in the presence of initial correlation, the subsystem will
evolve according to the desired CPTP map of the protocol. However CPTP maps cannot increase
the trace distance, which leads to:
‖B0(ν)−B′0(ν)‖Tr ≤ ‖ |Ψν〉 〈Ψν | − ρν‖Tr ≤  (30)
This also applies for projection operators and if in particular we consider Pcorrect, the projection
onto the correct output state, we also have that:
‖PcorrectB0(ν)− PcorrectB′0(ν)‖Tr ≤ ‖B0(ν)−B′0(ν)‖Tr ≤  (31)
Next we use the reverse triangle inequality, which gives us:∣∣ ‖PcorrectB0(ν)‖Tr − ‖PcorrectB′0(ν)‖Tr ∣∣ ≤ ‖PcorrectB0(ν)− PcorrectB′0(ν)‖Tr ≤  (32)
And since we are dealing with positive definite operators, we know that:
‖PcorrectB0(ν)‖Tr = 1
2
Tr(PcorrectB0(ν)) (33)
‖PcorrectB′0(ν)‖Tr =
1
2
Tr(PcorrectB
′
0(ν)) (34)
But Tr(PcorrectB0(ν)) = 1 (the completeness when we have ideal input), so:∣∣1− Tr(PcorrectB′0(ν))∣∣ ≤ 2 (35)
Lastly, because Tr(PcorrectB
′
0(ν)) ≤ 1, we get:
1− 2 ≤ Tr(PcorrectB′0(ν)) (36)
Thus, the probability of accepting a correct outcome, under the assumption that the input state is
-close to the ideal input, is greater than 1− 2.
It is now easy to see that the Proof of Theorem 1 follows directly from Definition 3 and Lemmas 8
and 9. Having the robustness property, the FK protocol can receive an input, which is -close to
its ideal value, from another protocol. As we have shown, even if this input is correlated with an
external system, we can still perform the verification as long as we have -closeness.
4 Proof of Compositionality
To prove the security of the composite protocol (Theorem 3), we first need to prove that the FK
protocol rejects with high probability a state close to a reflection about the XY -plane (Lemma 10).
Then we prove that the modified state tomography protocol (Protocol 3), satisfies the -closeness
property required by the (robust) FK. This is achieved by showing Lemmas 11 and 12. Finally we
give the proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 10. If the initial input state of the FK protocol is -close to a reflection about the XY -plane
of the ideal input state, the protocol will reject it with high probability.
20
Proof. First we note that the input to the FK protocol consists of XY -plane states and dummy
qubits which are either |0〉 or |1〉. The XY -plane states are invariant under the reflection, while the
dummy states will be flipped. Assume that there is a trap that has an odd number of (dummy)
neighbours. The verifier knows that he sent the state |+θ〉 and expects to make a Z correction if
the number of |1〉 neighbours is odd. However, if instead of what the verifier expects, there is an
overall reflection with respect to the XY -plane, then for each of the neighbours of the trap there
will be a new Z correction (the |0〉 will become |1〉 inducing a Z, while the |1〉 will become |0〉
undoing the previous Z correction, which is equivalent with another Z correction since Z2 = 1).
Therefore, if the neighbours of a trap are odd in number, he will expect the exact opposite result
and will deterministically detect the deviation. For this to happen it suffices that the verifier makes
sure that at least one trap has odd number of neighbours, something that can be easily achieved.
Therefore, the FK protocol will always reject the reflected ideal input state. Given that the input
is -close to this, we have shown in Lemma 8 that the outcome density operator changes by at most
O(
√
) from its ideal value. Thus, the output state is O(
√
) close to the reflected ideal input state.
It follows that the protocol will reject this state with at most probability 1−O(√).
In proving the correctness of our protocol we first need to show the correctness of the modified
state tomography protocol. Here we focus on the main results that we use for showing the correctness
and security of this protocol. We start with a theorem from [20]:
Theorem 5. [20] Fix Q = {pi1, . . . , pi2q} a complete, orthonormal set of q-qubit XZ-determined
pure states. For a sufficiently large constant α and for sufficiently large n, let m = m(n) ≥ qn and
N ≥ mα−1. Let σ ∈ [m]qn be a list of distinct indices. Consider a combination of the following two
protocols between the verifier, Eve, and the provers, Alice and Bob:
1. CHSH games: In the first protocol, Eve referees Nm sequential CHSH games. She accepts if∣∣{j ∈ [Nm] : AjBj = Xj ⊕ Yj}∣∣ ≥ cos2(pi/8)Nm− 12√2√Nm log(Nm) . (37)
2. State tomography: In the second protocol, Eve chooses K ∈ [N ] uniformly at random. She
referees (K − 1)m CHSH games. For the Kth set, she referees a state tomography protocol
with parameters q, n, m, Q and σ. She accepts if the following criteria are satisfied:
max
o∈[2q ]
∣∣#{j : Oj = o} − n/2q∣∣ ≤ 4q√n log n (38a)
max
o∈[2q ],P∈{I,X,Z}⊗q
|τ o,P − Tr(pioP )| ≤ 4q
√
(log n)/n . (38b)
The combined protocol satisfies the following completeness and soundness conditions:
Completeness: If Alice and Bob use Nm shared EPR states to play the CHSH games according
to an ideal strategy, and if Bob uses an ideal strategy with respect to the projections Q on
the Kth set of m EPR states in the state tomography protocol, then in both protocols,
Pr[Eve accepts] ≥ 1−O(n−1/2) . (39)
Soundness: Assume that for both protocols, Pr[Eve accepts] ≥ 1− n−1/3. Let ρ be Alice’s state in
the second protocol after (K − 1)m games and conditioned on Bob’s messages
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O1, . . . , On. Then there exists an isometry XA : HA ↪→ (C2)⊗m ⊗H′A such that letting ρσ,j be
XAρXA† reduced to Alice’s qubits {σ(j, i) : i ∈ [q]},
Pr
[∣∣{j ∈ [n] : Tr(ρσ,jpiOj ) ≥ 1−O(n−1/16)}∣∣ ≥ (1−O(n−1/16))n] ≥ 1− 4n−1/12 . (40)
Here, the probability is over K, the first (K − 1)m games and O1, . . . , On.
We give the following corollary to this theorem:
Corollary 2. By changing the measurement operators accordingly, a state tomography protocol
for q-qubit XY -determined (YZ-determined) states exists, and achieves the same completeness and
soundness bound as the one from Theorem 5.
Proof. As mentioned, if we consider the extended CHSH game (comprising of 6 CHSH games) and
try to rigidly determine the existence of a tensor product of |Ψ+〉 states, we can fix the strategies
of the provers up to an XY plane reflection. In particular, the results of an XZ state tomography
in the original setting hold here for XY (YZ) tomography. Therefore, it is possible to certify the
preparation of q-qubit XY -determined (YZ-determined) states.
We can now present the main lemma proving that Protocol 3 is a verification protocol.
Lemma 11. Protocol 3 has completeness lower bounded by 1 − O(n−1/2) and soundness upper
bounded by O(n−1/12).
Proof. According to corollary 2, the six state tomography protocols that constitute Protocol 3 are
valid verification protocols achieving the same bounds for completeness and soundness as the orig-
inal protocol from Theorem 5. We will ignore the case of XY plane reflections since, as we have
shown in Lemma 10, these are detected with overwhelming probability by the FK protocol. These
protocols can be “stitched” together in the same way the subprotocols of the RUV protocol are
stitched together. In fact, our case requires a much simpler analysis since the six state tomogra-
phy protocols are independent of each other. This means that in each subprotocol, the verifier is
not basing his questions on the results of any previous subprotocol. This nonadaptive technique
contrasts the RUV protocol in which the questions were adaptive. In the case of honest provers,
the verifier accepts if all subprotocols succeed. For each one, we know from Theorem 5 that the
probability of acceptance is ≥ 1−O(n−1/2), hence for the whole protocol the probability of accep-
tance is ≥ (1 − O(n−1/2))6 = 1 − O(n−1/2). Thus, we see that the completeness bound remains
unchanged. For soundness, assuming the provers are dishonest we know, again from Theorem 5,
that the probability of accepting an incorrect outcome is ≤ 4n−1/12. In our protocol, the provers can
be dishonest in any of the six subprotocols, therefore, by a union bound the probability of accepting
an incorrect outcome is ≤ 6 · 4n−1/12 = 24n−1/12. Therefore, we can say that the soundness of our
protocol is upper bounded by O(n−1/12).
We are now able to give the proof of our main result (Theorem 3) which concerns the properties
of the composite protocol (Protocol 4). To do this, we require an additional property.
Lemma 12. Assume the verifier wants to prepare a state ρ consisting of tensor products of qubits
which are all determined in either the XZ, XY or YZ bases. A successful run of Protocol 3 certifies
that, prover 1 has a state ρ′ such that ρ and ρ′ are close in trace distance.
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Proof. The proof is partially given in [20]. In the state tomography protocol, a prover prepares
multiple copies of a resource state. In [20] it is stated that if the verifier accepts, then, with high
probability, a subset of states of the prover are close in trace distance to copies of the resource
state.
The soundness condition of Theorem 5 states that:
Pr
[∣∣{j ∈ [n] : Tr(ρσ,jpiOj ) ≥ 1−O(n−1/16)}∣∣ ≥ (1−O(n−1/16))n] ≥ 1− 4n−1/12 . (41)
It is shown in [20] that this condition translates to the fact that with probability at least 1 −
O(n−1/48) we have:
‖ρS(O1,n)−⊗j∈SpiOj‖Tr ≤ O(n−1/64) (42)
Where S is uniformly random subset of size O(n1/64). If we denote O(n−1/64) as , O(n−1/48) as p,
ρS(O1,n) as ρ and ⊗j∈SpiOj as ρid then the state ρ′, that prover 1 has, is:
ρ′ = (1− p)ρ + p(I − ρ) (43)
We can see that, for sufficiently large n, the values of p and  tend to 0. Consequently, ρ′ approaches
ρ and ρ approaches the ideal state, ρid. Computing the trace distance between ρ
′ and ρid, we
obtain:
‖ρ′ − ρid‖Tr = ‖(1− p)ρ + p(I − ρ)− ρid‖Tr ≤ ‖ρ − ρid‖Tr + ‖p(I − 2ρ)‖Tr (44)
And using inequality 42, we have:
‖ρ′ − ρid‖Tr ≤ O(n−1/64) + 2p = O(n−1/64) +O(n−1/48) = O(n−1/64) (45)
Therefore, the state that prover 1 has, conditioned on his messages O1,n, is close to the state
comprised of copies of the resource states. Depending on which type of state tomography is done,
the resource states are determined in either the XZ, XY or Y Z bases.
Proof of Theorem 3. According to Lemmas 11 and 12, Protocol 3 is capable of preparing with
high probability, a multi-qubit state ρ on prover 1’s side, such that ρ is -close to a tensor product
of states determined in either the XZ, XY or Y Z bases. In fact, each subprotocol is capable of
such a preparation. For the two XY state tomography protocols we choose the resource state to
be:
|+〉 ⊗ ∣∣+pi/4〉⊗ ∣∣+2pi/4〉⊗ ∣∣+3pi/4〉⊗ ∣∣+4pi/4〉⊗ ∣∣+5pi/4〉⊗ ∣∣+6pi/4〉⊗ ∣∣+7pi/4〉 (46)
For the two XZ state tomography protocols we choose the resource state to be:
|0〉 ⊗ |1〉 ⊗ |0〉 ⊗ |1〉 (47)
This allows us to prepare multi-qubit states on prover 1’s side which are close in trace distance
to the FK input consisting of XY -plane states and dummy qubits (the |0〉, |1〉 qubits). If we de-
note as ρ1 the multi-qubit state consisting of multiple copies of the XY resource state and ρ2 as
the multi-qubit state consisting of multiple copies of the XZ resource state, then the FK input is
effectively ρ1 ⊗ ρ2. Lemma 12 shows that with high probability prover 1 will have a state ρ′1 that
is prep-close to ρ1 and a state ρ
′
2 that is prep-close to ρ2, where prep = O(n
−1/64). Therefore,
ρ′1 ⊗ ρ′2 is 2prep-close to ρ1 ⊗ ρ2. Moreover, in [20] it is proven in the state tomography protocol
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prover 1 is completely blind regarding his state. Given this, and using Theorem 1, we can compose
the modified state tomography protocol (Protocol 3) with the FK protocol to achieve a new blind
verification protocol. The state ρ′1 ⊗ ρ′2 is used as input for the FK protocol, since it is -close to
the ideal input, where  = 2prep.
The bound on completeness for the new protocol can be computed from the completeness bounds
of the constituent protocols. In the honest provers setting, the verifier’s acceptance probability for
modified state tomography is 1 − O(n−1/2), and for FK with deviated input it is 1 − O(√) =
1 − O(n−1/128). Multiplying these together and taking the leading order terms we find that com-
pleteness of the protocol is upper bounded by 1−O(n−1/128).
For soundness, in the dishonest setting if the verifier would reject in either modified state tomogra-
phy or FK then he would reject in the new protocol as well. The bound on soundness for modified
state tomography is O(n−1/12) and for FK is
(
2
3
)d 2d
5
e
, where d is the security parameter of the FK
protocol that specifies the size of the encoding for the computation graph. From a union bound we
get that the soundness for our composite approach is
(
2
3
)d 2d
5
e
+O(n−1/12).
The last part of the proof deals with the round complexity of our composite approach. In the
previous proof of Lemma 12 we mentioned that prover 1’s state restricted to subset of O(n1/64)
qubits is close in trace distance to the ideal state. However we need n to be sufficiently large so that
this subset of qubits can encompass the entire FK input. We know that the FK input comprises of
O(|C|2) qubits, where C is the computation the verifier wants to perform. This means, that we need
O(|C|128) qubits in total so that we can claim that a state of O(|C|2) qubits is close to its intended
value. Recall that from Thereom 5, the number of rounds for state tomography is O(nα), where we
know from [20] that α > 16. This means that the total number of rounds must be O(|C|c), where
c > 128 · 16 = 2048. If we relabel n to be |C| then the round complexity is O(nc).
5 Proof of Fault Tolerance
The main result of this section is the proof of Theorem 4 that gives a fault tolerant FK protocol.
We first prove Lemmas 3, 4, 5 and 6 that as stressed in Section 2.3, highlights why we cannot use
results similar to the robustness and why the simplest approaches fail. Then we proceed in the
proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Lemma 3. We can compute a bound on the trace distance between an arbitrary qubit
ρi and E(ρi):
‖ρi − E(ρi)‖Tr = ‖ρi − (1− p)ρi − (p/3)([X] + [Y ] + [Z])ρi([X] + [Y ] + [Z])‖Tr (48)
‖ρi − E(ρi)‖Tr = p‖ρi − (1/3)([X] + [Y ] + [Z])ρi([X] + [Y ] + [Z])‖Tr (49)
But we know that the trace distance is upper bounded by 1, so:
‖ρi − E(ρi)‖Tr ≤ p (50)
Now we compute the trace distance between σ = ⊗ni=1ρi and σ′ = ⊗ni=1E(ρi):
‖σ − σ′‖Tr = ‖ ⊗ni=1 ρi −⊗ni=1E(ρi)‖Tr ≤
n∑
i=1
‖ρi − E(ρi)‖Tr ≤ np (51)
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Since the trace distance is upper bounded by 1 and since np can exceed 1 for sufficiently large n,
we have:
‖σ − σ′‖Tr ≤ min(1, np) (52)
Consider σ = ⊗ni=1 |0〉 〈0|. Under the action of the depolarizing channel the trace distance between
σ and σ′ is n‖ |0〉 〈0| − E(|0〉 〈0|)‖Tr. However ‖ |0〉 〈0| − E(|0〉 〈0|)‖Tr =
√
2p
3 , therefore the distance
between σ and σ′ is n
√
2p
3 . For sufficiently large n this can clearly reach the maximum value of
1.
Proof of Lemma 4. Because of the action of the partially depolarizing channel, each trap qubit
has a probability p of being changed. We make the simplifying assumption that an affected qubit
will produce a wrong measurement result. This assumption is only valid for completeness, where
we assume that the devices are honest but faulty4. We then have that the probability of a trap
measurement producing a correct outcome is upper bounded by 1−p. Given that trap measurements
are independent of each other, and assuming we have NT traps, the probability that all trap
measurements produce correct outcomes is upper bounded by (1− p)NT . Since the verifier accepts
if and only if all trap measurements succeed it follows that the completeness is upper bounded by
(1− p)NT .
Proof of Lemma 5. Define the following Bernoulli random variable:
Xt =
{
1, if measurement of trap t fails.
0, otherwise.
(53)
Under the simplifying assumption of the previous lemma, we have Pr(Xt = 1) = p ≥ 0. Next, we
define:
F =
NT∑
t=1
Xt (54)
It is clear that E(F ) = NT p. Additionally, using a Hoeffding inequality, we have that:
Pr(F ≥ (p+ )NT ) ≤ exp(−22NT ) (55)
This gives the probability that the number of failed traps is greater than our threshold of pNT .
The complement of this is the completeness, which is therefore bounded by 1− exp(−22NT )
Proof of Lemma 6. Recall that soundness is the probability of accepting an incorrect outcome. In
the original FK protocol this meant that all the traps succeeded but the computation output was
orthogonal to the correct output. This is expressed with the projector P⊥ ⊗ PT . Here P⊥ projects
the computation output onto the orthogonal state and PT projects the trap outputs onto the
correct outputs. If the accepting condition is given by a threshold of correct traps, the projector
must change accordingly. This means that there should not be only one trap projector but one
for each accepting situation. Taking the threshold to be pNT means that the verifier accepts if
T = NT − pNT traps succeeded. Since these traps can be any combination of T out of the possible
NT , there are
(
NT
T
)
possible accepting situations. Therefore, the trap projector PT becomes a sum
of
(
NT
T
)
projectors (one for each accepting choice of traps). It therefore follows from linearity that
the soundness bound becomes
(
NT
T
) (
2
3
)d 2d
5
e
.
4If the devices were dishonest, we would need to take into account the deviation on the trap qubits resulting from
malevolent behaviour.
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Proof of Theorem 4. In [34], Morimae and Fujii show how a blind quantum computation can
be made fault tolerant by encoding it in a topologically protected error-correcting code [28]. The
encoding then uses a decoration trick so that the prover only needs to perform XY -plane measure-
ments and this can be done blindly using the UBQC protocol in [1]. Here, we use the same idea to
encode a computation which also contains an isolated trap. This follows from the first verification
protocol introduced in [1] which uses a brickwork state to perform the computation. Encoding this
in the fault tolerant code give us the lattice Lν , which according to [34] can be executed blindly by
the prover.
Throughout the run of the protocol, if the prover is always honest then the fault tolerant code
will correct for any errors (since we have assumed the error rate is smaller than the threshold of
correctable errors). This proves that the completeness of the protocol is 1.
To compute the soundness, note that the computed bound for the brickwork state protocol in [1]
is:
pincorrect <
(
1− 1
2n
)
(56)
Where n is the number of qubits in the brickwork state. Similar to the robustness proof, the proof
of this bound assumes that the outcome density operator of the protocol is projected onto a state
where the trap succeeded but the computation outcome is incorrect. It is can been shown that the
same bound as the non-fault tolerant case holds. This means that we have:
pincorrect <
(
1− 1
2n′
)
(57)
Where n′ is the number of qubits in a lattice Lνi , out of the N lattices used in the protocol. We
note that n′ is of the same order as n [28], and we can choose a constant c > 2 such that 2n′ = cn.
In Protocol 5 the verifier creates independent encodings Lν , each depending on classical randomness.
He accepts the sequence of encodings if all trap measurements succeed in each encoding. This means
that the prover can deceive the verifier if he can deviate the computation in each encoding Lν while
at the same time passing all the traps. However, for any given encoding we know that the probability
of this happening is given by pincorrect, and because of independence, the prover will succeed for
the sequence with probability:
pNincorrect <
(
1− 1
cn
)N
(58)
We know that N/R > 1/ log
(
cn
cn−1
)
. However, this is equivalent to:
N/R > −1/ log
(
1− 1
cn
)
(59)
(N/R) log
(
1− 1
cn
)
< −1 (60)
Note that we used the fact that log
(
1− 1cn
)
< 0. Through exponentiation we get:(
1− 1
cn
)N/R
<
1
2
(61)
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And we finally obtain:
pNincorrect <
1
2R
(62)
Hence, the probability that the prover deceives the verifier is less than (1/2)R and so the soundness
of the protocol is upper bounded by this value.
Lastly we compute the round complexity of this protocol. For the given sequence we have N
encodings and for each encoding we have O(n) qubits5 and a corresponding round complexity of
O(n) to compute the execution of that encoding. It follows that the overall complexity is O(Nn).
But we know that N < R/ log
(
1 + 1cn−1
)
+ O(1), and given that R is a constant, we can show
that N is O(n). This follows from the observation that dividing the function 1/ log
(
1 + 1cn−1
)
with
(cn− 1) gives a constant in the n→∞ limit:
lim
n→∞(cn− 1) log
(
1 +
1
cn− 1
)
=
1
ln 2
(63)
Incorporating this result yields overall complexity O(n2). Note that this proof technique works for
the case of classical output since we are interested in the classical output of each encoding. The
encodings are independent from each other, which allows us to bound the probability for the whole
sequence.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that the single server universal verifiable blind quantum computing protocol of
[1] is robust even against general adversaries. This protocol is currently the optimal protocol in
terms of the verifier’s requirements. The robustness result further strengthens the scheme for re-
alistic applications where the effect of noisy devices should also be considered, as highlighted in a
recent experimental demonstration of the protocol [17]. Moreover, it enables us to compose the FK
protocol with other quantum verification protocols, extend it to the entangled servers setting and
make it device independent. The key property that we proved, is that the protocol remains secure
even against correlated attacks. To achieve this, we considered the deviation of the evolution of a
correlated subsystem from the evolution of uncorrelated subsystems. The former could be written
mathematically as a non-CPTP map which differs from a CPTP map by an inhomogeneous term.
However, for inputs which are -close to the ideal FK input, we showed that this deviation (the
inhomogeneous term) is bounded by a term of order O(
√
). Our proof technique is generic and
can be potentially applied to other multi-party protocols where sequential composition is required.
This result complements the local -verifiability proof of [24] which is based on the universal compos-
ability framework. The latter, in its current form, is insufficient for composing entanglement-based
protocols, such as RUV, with the FK protocol because of the possibility of correlated attacks.
Our robustness result, however, leads to a stand alone secure composite verification protocol. Ad-
ditionaly, the proposed composition scheme could potentially be used to extend the composable
framework of [24] to incorporate multiple provers.
5Note that here, unlike in the composite protocol, we have a linear number of qubits for the protocol. This is
because we are not using the dotted-complete version of the FK protocol, but the one using a brickwork state. It is
explained in [1] that this version of the protocol requires O(n) qubits.
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Our proposed composite protocol achieves verification with a classical client (device indepen-
dence) and gives improved round complexity in comparison to the RUV protocol. It uses only
the (modified) state tomography part of RUV as input for the FK protocol. The improved round
complexity of the composite protocol is still too high to allow for any practical implementation in
the near future. However, the reason for this high round complexity is the state tomography sub-
protocol and therefore, any improvement on how to prepare the FK inputs (e.g. by exploiting the
shared entanglement of the provers or using self-testing techniques as in [32]) will directly improve
the efficiency of our composite protocol as well.
Finally we outlined how to make our verification protocol fault tolerant. To do so we constructed
a fault tolerant version of the FK protocol which is interesting in its own right. This complements
the work presented in [34] which addresses the fault tolerance of a (non-verifiable) blind quantum
computing protocol. We used the same topological error correcting code as [34] and a sequential
repetition scheme in order to correct for faulty devices.
Acknowledgements
Shortly before uploading a prepint on the arxiv, the authors became aware of parallel and indepen-
dent research by Hajdusek, Perez-Delgado and Fitzsimons, which also addresses device-independent
verifiable blind quantum computing and appeared the same day in the arxiv [32]. We would like to
thank Vedran Dunjko and Theodoros Kapourniotis for useful discussions. PW gratefully acknowl-
edges partial support from COST Action MP1006.
References
[1] Joseph F. Fitzsimons and Elham Kashefi. Unconditionally verifiable blind computation, 2012.
Eprint:arXiv:1203.5217.
[2] Ben W. Reichardt, Reichardt Falk Unger, and Umesh Vazirani. Classical command of quantum
systems. Nature, 496:456–460, 2013.
[3] Scott Aaronson and Alex Arkhipov. The computational complexity of linear optics. In Proceed-
ings of the Forty-third Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC ’11, pages
333–342, New York, NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
[4] Michael A. Nielsen and Isaac L. Chuang. Quantum Computation and Quantum Information.
Cambridge University Press, 2000.
[5] Umesh Vazirani and Thomas Vidick. Fully device-independent quantum key distribution.
Phys. Rev. Lett., 113:140501, Sep 2014.
[6] S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. The knowledge complexity of interactive proof
systems. SIAM J. Comput., 18(1):186–208, February 1989.
[7] John Watrous. Pspace has constant-round quantum interactive proof systems. In Proceedings
of the 40th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS ’99, pages 112–,
Washington, DC, USA, 1999. IEEE Computer Society.
[8] Anne Broadbent, Joseph Fitzsimons, and Elham Kashefi. Universal blind quantum compu-
tation. In Proceedings of the 50th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science,
FOCS ’09, pages 517 – 526. IEEE Computer Society, 2009.
28
[9] Anna Pappa, Andre´ Chailloux, Stephanie Wehner, Eleni Diamanti, and Iordanis Kerenidis.
Multipartite entanglement verification resistant against dishonest parties. Phys. Rev. Lett.,
108:260502, Jun 2012.
[10] Dorit Aharonov, Michael Ben-Or, and Elad Eban. Interactive proofs for quantum computa-
tions. In Proceedings of Innovations in Computer Science 2010, ICS2010, pages 453–, 2010.
[11] Scott Aaronson and Alex Arkhipov. Bosonsampling is far from uniform. Quantum Info.
Comput., 14(15-16):1383–1423, November 2014.
[12] Matthew McKague. Interactive proofs for BQP via self-tested graph states, 2013.
Eprint:arXiv:1309.5675.
[13] Theodoros Kapourniotis, Elham Kashefi, and Animesh Datta. Blindness and Verification of
Quantum Computation with One Pure Qubit. In 9th Conference on the Theory of Quantum
Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2014), volume 27, pages 176–204, 2014.
[14] Frdric Dupuis, JesperBuus Nielsen, and Louis Salvail. Actively secure two-party evaluation
of any quantum operation. In Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Ran Canetti, editors, Advances in
Cryptology CRYPTO 2012, volume 7417 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 794–811.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.
[15] Sean Hallgren, Adam Smith, and Fang Song. Classical cryptographic protocols in a quantum
world. In Phillip Rogaway, editor, Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO 2011, volume 6841 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 411–428. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011.
[16] A. Broadbent, G. Gutoski, and D. Stebila. Quantum one-time programs. In Advances in
Cryptology–CRYPTO 2013, pages 344–360. 2013.
[17] Stefanie Barz, Joseph F. Fitzsimons, Elham Kashefi, and Philip Walther. Experimental veri-
fication of quantum computation. Nature Physics, 9:727–731, 2013.
[18] Dorit Aharonov and Umesh Vazirani. Is quantum mechanics falsifiable? a computational
perspective on the foundations of quantum mechanics, 2012. Eprint:arXiv:1206.3686.
[19] Scott Aaronson. The Scott Aaronson 25.00$ Prize. http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/
?p=284. Accessed: Jan. 30 2015.
[20] Ben W. Reichardt, Falk Unger, and Umesh Vazirani. A classical leash for a quantum system:
Command of quantum systems via rigidity of CHSH games, 2012. Eprint:arXiv:1209.0448.
[21] Dominique Unruh. Universally composable quantum multi-party computation. In Henri
Gilbert, editor, Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT 2010, volume 6110 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 486–505. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.
[22] Renato Renner and Robert Ko¨nig. Universally composable privacy amplification against quan-
tum adversaries. In Joe Kilian, editor, Theory of Cryptography, volume 3378 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 407–425. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005.
[23] Michael Ben-Or, Micha Horodecki, DebbieW. Leung, Dominic Mayers, and Jonathan Oppen-
heim. The universal composable security of quantum key distribution. In Joe Kilian, editor,
Theory of Cryptography, volume 3378 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 386–406.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005.
29
[24] Vedran Dunjko, Joseph F. Fitzsimons, Christopher Portmann, and Renato Renner. Compos-
able security of delegated quantum computation. In Advances in Cryptology ASIACRYPT
2014, volume 8874 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 406–425. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2014.
[25] Michael Ben-Or, Shafi Goldwasser, Joe Kilian, and Avi Wigderson. Multi-prover interactive
proofs: How to remove intractability assumptions. In Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC ’88, pages 113–131, New York, NY, USA,
1988. ACM.
[26] Robert Raussendorf and Hans J. Briegel. A one-way quantum computer. Phys. Rev. Lett.,
86:5188–5191, May 2001.
[27] Vincent Danos, Elham Kashefi, and Prakash Panangaden. The measurement calculus. J.
ACM, 54(2), April 2007.
[28] R. Raussendorf, J. Harrington, and K. Goyal. Topological fault-tolerance in cluster state
quantum computation. New Journal of Physics, 2007.
[29] John F. Clauser, Michael A. Horne, Abner Shimony, and Richard A. Holt. Proposed experiment
to test local hidden-variable theories. Phys. Rev. Lett., 23:880–884, Oct 1969.
[30] Hiroyuki Hayashi, Gen Kimura, and Yukihiro Ota. Kraus representation in the presence of
initial correlations. Phys. Rev. A, 67:062109, Jun 2003.
[31] Vedran Dunjko, Elham Kashefi, and Anthony Leverrier. Universal blind quantum computing
with weak coherent pulses, 2011. Eprint:arXiv:1108.5571.
[32] Michal Hajdusˇek, Carlos A. Pe´rez-Delgado, and Joseph F. Fitzsimons. Device-independent
verifiable blind quantum computation, 2015. Eprint:arXiv:1502.02563.
[33] Matthew McKague and Michele Mosca. Generalized self-testing and the security of the 6-state
protocol. In Proceedings of the 5th Conference on Theory of Quantum Computation, Commu-
nication, and Cryptography, TQC’10, pages 113–130, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011. Springer-Verlag.
[34] Tomoyuki Morimae and Keisuke Fujii. Blind topological measurement-based quantum com-
putation. Nature Communications, September 2012.
[35] Yu-Bo Sheng and Lan Zhou. Deterministic entanglement distillation for secure double-server
blind quantum computation. Sci. Rep., 5, Jan 2015. Article.
[36] Tomoyuki Morimae and Keisuke Fujii. Secure entanglement distillation for double-server blind
quantum computation. Phys. Rev. Lett., 111:020502, Jul 2013.
30
